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This paper explores the relationship between Europeanization and multi-level governance. In particular, it assesses the extent to which Europeanization has promoted multi-level governance within Britain. In doing so, the paper draws on contributions to a UACES study group and ESRC seminar series on The Europeanization of British Politics and Policy-Making. ​[1]​ This project focuses on Europeanization in relation to the dimensions of polity, politics and policy and addresses a range of questions relating to the domestic effects of EU membership (Bache and Jordan, forthcoming). However, this paper focuses on the specific issue of multi-level governance and draws on just three of the contributions to the project, in addition to the author’s own research and other materials. In each of these cases, the domestic effect of EU cohesion policy is prominent.
There are both conceptual and empirical reasons for asking whether EU membership has promoted multi-level governance in Britain. From the conceptual perspective of Europeanization (below), there is a broadly defined ‘misfit’ between the nature of EU governance and that in Britain; in institutional terms, between the multi-layered and multi-actor EU system and the traditionally strong centralised British state; and, in political terms, between EU political norms of cooperation and consensus-seeking and the adversarial style of politics in Britain. From a Europeanization perspective, the greater the degree of misfit between the EU and member state governance, the greater the degree of adaptational pressure and thus the greater the likelihood of domestic change.
Empirical developments also suggest the question is worth asking. In recent years, the British system of governance has experienced significant change, which has accelerated its transformation towards a multi-level polity. Most obviously this is marked by political devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; but there are less obvious changes at other territorial levels (the English regions and local/municipal and sub-local levels) and in the horizontal dimension to governance, for example in the proliferation of partnership governance (involving various mixes of public, private and voluntary sectors). That much of this transformation has occurred since the election of Labour in 1997 suggests strong domestic explanations for these developments and this paper does not dispute the importance of these – particularly in relation to political devolution. However, over a longer period, Europeanization has also been significant; particularly in relation to the emergence of English regional governance, the strategies and approaches of local authorities, and the spread of community-led decision-making.
The paper proceeds in the following way. The next two sections, on Europeanization and multi-level governance, set the conceptual context. The fourth section briefly outlines EU cohesion policy, which is a key aspect of the case studies. The fifth section considers the findings on this topic from the study group discussed above, along with other research. The paper concludes by reflecting on the Europeanization effects on multi-level governance in Britain.

Europeanization 
In the debates over the meaning and relevance of the term Europeanization, several core approaches have emerged. This section highlights six main uses of the term Europeanization; some of which overlap while others do not​[2]​. These are:
The top down impact of the EU on its member states. This is the oldest and the most widely adopted usage of Europeanization. Héritier et al., (2001: 3) defined Europeanization in this sense as ‘the process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative structures.’ In this mode, the EU acts in a very top down fashion through legal and other policy acts. Buller and Gamble (2002: 17) referred to Europeanization as, ‘a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics’. More recently, Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 4), suggested that Europeanization consists of ‘processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies’.
The accumulation of policy competences at the EU level. Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001: 1) equated Europeanization with ‘the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance.’ In this mode, Europeanization is synonymous with the process of European integration – i.e., the development of the EU polity.
The growing importance of the EU as a reference point for national and sub-national actors (e.g. Hanf and Soetendorp 1998: 1). In this mode, the EU is akin to a lodestar that is difficult if not impossible to ignore. As the EU’s powers have grown, national (and subnational) actors have adjusted their expectations and activities, for example lobbying directly in Brussels and Strasbourg, rather than through their national governments.
The horizontal transfer of concepts and policies in the EU between member states.  Bomberg and Peterson (2000) related Europeanization to the term ‘policy transfer’, while Burch and Gomez (2003: 2) and (Howell, 2003) argued that it encompasses examples of ‘cross-loading’ through which states share ideas and practices. In this mode, the EU is at best a facilitator of inter-state transfer, through mechanisms of learning and borrowing such as the open method of coordination.
The two-way interaction between states and the EU. This definition arose from the empirical observation that states routinely pre-empt domestic adjustment by shaping an emergent EU policy in their own image (Bomberg and Peterson 2000: 8). They attempt to ‘domesticate’ the EU by uploading national models to the EU. In this view, Europeanization is ‘circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one off’ (Goetz 2002: 4). Laffan and Stubb (2003: 70) describe Europeanization as ‘the process whereby national systems (institutions, policies, governments) adapt to EU policies and integration more generally, while also themselves shaping the European Union’.
A discursively constructed external constraint on national autonomy or ‘smokescreen’ for domestic political manoeuvres. According to this view, the pressure to change coming down from the EU is by no means an objectively defined reality. On the contrary, it may well offer a discursively constructed constraint behind which domestic actors can hide their real intentions. For example, ‘Europe’ can be invoked to legitimize financially costly and politically controversial measures such as labour market reform, anti-competitive measures or environmental protection (see, Buller, 2000: Buller and Gamble, 2002; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; Radaelli, 2004). 
		These six usages are only the most popular ones. Olsen (2002) argues that Europeanization could also be used to describe the territorial expansion of the EU (e.g. the process of enlarging the EU to incorporate new members), or the process through which European forms of governance spread out to other parts of the world. 
In the project described above (Bache and Jordan, forthcoming), the term Europeanization is used to frame an analysis of the impact of European integration on British politics. We assume that the phenomenon is complex, that disentangling key variables is likely to be difficult and that we should be wary of ascribing causality to Europeanization rather than globalization or domestic changes. Following this, we try to be realistic about what can be investigated empirically by prioritising the top-down effects and, more specifically, by defining Europeanization as

the reorientation or reshaping of aspects of politics (and governance) in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices and preferences of European level actors (as advanced through EU initiatives and decisions). 

However, this approach (i.e. Usage 1 above) does not exclude consideration of a more dynamic and interactive relationship between the EU and Britain, or that potential contribution to explanation of other processes detailed under some of the other definitions and usages of Europeanization identified. These may be an important part of the explanation, not least where there is not “a clear, vertical chain of command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the member states” (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, 641).

Multi-level Governance
Multi-level governance characterizes the changing relationships between actors situated at different territorial levels and from public, private and voluntary sectors. The concept is used both analytically and normatively; that is, to capture the nature of decision-making and to advocate particular arrangements. Analytically, it draws on frameworks and concepts from across political science sub-disciplines and contributes to a growing awareness that many contemporary issues and challenges require analysis that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries. Most specifically, multi-level governance crosses the traditionally separate domains of domestic and international politics to highlight the increasingly blurred distinction between these domains in the context of European integration.
Multi-level governance was first developed from a study of EU cohesion policy (below) and subsequent applied to EU decision-making more generally. An early explication referred to multi-level governance as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: 392) and described how ‘supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks’ (Marks, 1993: 402-403). It emphasized both the increasingly frequent and complex vertical interactions between governmental actors and the increasingly important horizontal dimension, as non-state actors increasingly mobilized in cohesion policy-making and in the EU polity more generally. As such, multi-level governance raised new and important questions about the role, power and authority of nation-states.
In clarifying and refining the concept, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2003; 2004) distinguished between two types of multi-level governance. Type I multi-level governance resembles federalism. It sees the dispersion of authority as being restricted to a limited number of (non-overlapping) jurisdictional boundaries at a limited number of territorial levels. Here, jurisdictions are general-purpose with those jurisdictions at the lower territorial levels ‘nested’ into higher ones. In this typology, the distribution of authority is seen as relatively stable and the focus of analysis is on individual governments or institutions rather than on specific issues or policies. Type II multi-level governance presents a picture of governance that is more complex, more fluid and consisting of innumerable jurisdictions. These jurisdictions often overlap each other and tend to be flexible as governance demands change. They are focused around specific policy sectors and issues and devised to secure optimal policy-making efficiency. In this typology, the distribution of authority is less stable and the focus of analysis is more on specific issues and policy areas than on individual governments or institutions.
These types of multi-level governance are not mutually exclusive, but co-exist: Britain is a case in point. General-purpose jurisdictions exist alongside special purpose jurisdictions: formal institutions of government operate, and indeed create, special purpose bodies to carry out particular tasks or address particular problems. There may be tensions between the two, for example in relation to issues of accountability over particular decisions and outcomes. But such tensions and their resolution are a characteristic feature of multi-level governance.

EU Cohesion Policy
EU cohesion policy aims to promote social and economic cohesion across Europe. The main financial instruments of cohesion policy, the structural funds, are aimed largely at promoting the development of disadvantaged regions and localities in the context of market integration. The importance of cohesion policy was elevated in the context of moves to complete the single European market, and to assimilate Greece, Portugal and Spain into the European Community. In 1989, financial allocations to the structural funds were doubled and new governing principles for structural policy were introduced. Additionality required that EU funds be spent in addition to planned domestic spending: concentration focused funds on areas of greatest need; programming required regions to develop strategic multi-annual plans to ensure coherence between projects funded; and, perhaps most importantly, partnership required that funds be administered through regional partnerships consisting of national, subnational and supranational (European Commission) representatives. 
The partnership requirement gave subnational actors a formal role in the EU policy process for the first time. In subsequent years, the Commission pushed for and secured agreement to the greater involvement of non-state actors (non-governmental organisations, trade unions, environmental groups etc.) within the process, thus providing a stronger horizontal dimension to the increasingly established vertical interactions.
These developments were integral to the early elaboration of the multi-level governance concept and prompted widespread debate on the prospects for territorial and governance change in Europe. This debate focused on the empowerment of regional level and the potential for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in which national governments would be undermined by coordinated action from above and below. Such was the popularity of this notion that it was adopted as a slogan by some regions and even by the Commission for a short while under the presidency of Jacques Delors (John, 2001: 73). Research on different member states identified significantly different effects in the empowerment of regions through EU cohesion policy, with the pre-existing nature of territorial and government-society relations within a state as key variables in explaining the degree of change (Hooghe, 1996). 
EU cohesion policy continues to have a central place in the debate on the territorial and governance effects of the EU on its member (and accession) states. It now accounts for approximately one-third of the EU’s total budget and remains an important source of funding for both regions and localities in both established and new member states. The effects of cohesion policy on regional empowerment remain important. However, the predominant focus on regions has obscured other important governance effects of cohesion policy at sub-regional, municipal and sub-municipal levels. Below the regional level, new structures have emerged, new actors have engaged and new patterns of activity have developed. The emerging forms of multi-level governance that are evident are often less orderly than the ‘triadic dynamic’ (between, regions governments and the EU) typically portrayed (see John, 2001) and are closer to the Type 2 multi-level governance identified by Hooghe and Marks (2004). 

Europeanization and Multi-level Governance in Britain
The case study of Britain suggests that even in a highly centralised state, Europeanization has promoted multi-level governance over the past 15 years or so. In particular it has strengthened the horizontal dimension through its promotion of partnership governance, which has become embedded in domestic practices across an increasing number of policy fields. Of course, there are domestic effects at work here, but there is evidence of a distinct EU-effect. The EU effects on the vertical dimension of multi-level governance, and specifically on devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are generally less significant than domestic effects. However, there has been a significant territorial effect at the level of the English regions. 

The English Regions
In the 1980s, there was not even an agreed boundary for the English regions - the most commonly used regional classification was that of the standard region, which originated from the areas covered by the Economic Planning Councils established by the Labour government in 1965. Different government departments made adjustments to the regional boundaries to fit their needs. The Department of the Environment (DoE) treated London as a separate region, and the DoE, Department for Trade and Industry and Department of Transport (DoT) reallocated counties such as Essex and Hertfordshire out of the South East and into the Eastern region (Church, 1993: 2). Other organisations such as gas, water, and electricity companies defined their own regional structures rather than follow the patterns of the standard regions. For its part, the EU used the standard regions classifications for its purposes, despite the fact that the Economic Planning Councils were abolished in 1979 (Bache, George and Rhodes, 1996: 59)
After the abolition of the Economic Planning Councils by the new Conservative government, the prospects for the development of English regionalism faded further. The Conservative government showed no appetite for devolution and rejected interventionist regional policies on principle. The regional dimension of the EU’s structural policy entered this vacuum. The government tolerated the EU’s regional policy primarily to secure financial reimbursement to the national Treasury, which acted as ‘financial gatekeeper’ over the distribution of these funds (Bache, 1999). However, this policy became a key part of a renewed push for English regionalism.
Burch and Gomez (2004) consider the emergence of a ‘new English regionalism’ in two phases: 1991-1997 and post-1997. In the first phase, they highlight the importance of the EU structural funds in shaping administrative processes at regional level (notably partnership) and also in having a ‘more modest’ regionalising impact. They speak of their ‘galvanising effect’ and suggest they are at the ‘very heart’ of change, although noting the degree of change varied significantly across the English regions according to the degree of EU funding and response of key domestic players. Burch and Gomez (2004: 20) pointed to the effects of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) requirements in particular: 

‘The programming concept helped to both develop and consolidate the regional tier by creating a clear focus for activities and opportunities for engagement and activism on the part of regional players. Formal requirements to operate on the basis of partnership also exerted a powerful regionalising effect by forcing those actors involved in delivering Structural Funds to devise new ways of working with sub-national interests [italics added].

Alongside the impetus provided by the structural funds were domestic factors that gave a push to regionalism, particularly ‘elite dissatisfaction with inter-regional disparities’. It is noted that, with the exception of the North East region, this dissatisfaction did not have popular foundations. The combination of the top-down incentives provided by the structural funds and these bottom-up shifts provided the momentum for strengthened English regional governance. The early 1990s was the ‘critical moment’ when the new English regionalism began to emerge.
Before 1997, the key institutional change at regional level was the creation of integrated Government Regional Offices (GROs) in 1994. The GROs were designed to strengthen central coordination at the regional and local level, particularly in relation to EU and domestic regeneration funds. However, Burch and Gomez (2004: 5) argue that the creation of GROs had a number of unintended consequences for the promotion of English regionalism:
	it linked the notions of integrated policy and regional delivery in the minds of Whitehall decision-makers;
	it encouraged the development of regionally focused interest networks;
	it gave a push to regional identities by finally establishing what were to become accepted as the standard boundaries for the English regions.
After 1997, the primary force behind English regionalism became constitutional change, with European factors secondary. Labour’s devolution programme brought the UK closer to multi-level governance, with devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the creation of a Greater London Authority. Regional Development Agencies and consultative Regional Chambers were created in the English regions. These institutional developments fell short of the hopes of English regionalists, but this period gave ‘critical momentum’ to the development of English regional governance and ‘provided a new platform from which regional players could engage with a far wider range of European issues, such as enlargement, transport and environmental policy’ (Burch and Gomez, 2004: 12). 
The EU effects in this period are less clear than in the one before: the ‘EU related efforts’ affecting the regions were greater, but so were efforts aimed at the regions generally. Again, in this period, the structural funds had the greatest EU effects - particularly in shaping the organisational structures in those regions with the largest receipts. For example, the government’s decision to give RDAs strategic responsibility for the structural funds prompted several of them to reorganise internally to perform this function. Further, as new regional machinery was developed to coordinate both the reception and projection responses to the EU, there was pressure from local authorities and other subnational actors to be included in these forums, ‘an indication of the extent to which partnership working has penetrated the machinery of government’ (Burch and Gomez, 2004: 17).
Bachtler and Taylor (2003: 24) provide supporting evidence of the regionalising effect of the structural funds in England. They point out that elements of structural fund programming that ‘are evident in the Regional Economic Strategies drawn up by the English regional development agencies, as well as the integration of government expenditure for regeneration across several policy areas in a “single pot”’. More broadly, research by ECOTEC (2003: 46) recognised the 1989 move towards a regional approach to structural fund programming as ‘a a factor encouraging a resurgence of regional strategic capacity across the UK’ and argued that ‘multi-agency approaches to planning stimulated by the structural funds are now increasingly embedded at regional level’ (ECOTEC, 2003: 47).
In short, there can be little doubt that the 1989 requirements of reform of the structural funds, particularly in relation to regional programming and regional partnerships, provided the major push for activity at the English regional level in this period. Despite the steering role of central government, EU cohesion policy reinforced the standard regions as the ‘official’ boundaries and created embryonic regional networks in England that provided something for the Labour government to build on from 1997​[3]​. 

The Local/Municipal Level
Adam Marshall’s (2004:2) study of urban governance, suggests at ‘distinct, two-way process of Europeanization … driven primarily by the availability of large quantities of EU Structural Funding’. His contribution takes the debate on the effects of EU structural funding away from its usual focus on regions and regionalism, to identify the effects on cities and metropolitan sub-regions. He argues that the EU’s principles of partnership and programming have been embraced by domestic actors and spread to other (non-EU) areas of cooperation. 
Marshall’s case studies, Birmingham and Glasgow, were chosen because of their long histories of interaction with the EU and particularly the structural funds. He acknowledges that the adaptational pressures here would be higher than in cities that have had less consistent interaction with EU programmes. In these cases though, ‘downward adaptational pressures have caused urban councils to embrace change and new modes of working’. Specifically, the strategic and holistic approaches to regeneration advanced by EU programming requirements have been adopted by the cities more generally. Bachtler and Taylor (2003: 21-22) also identified the incorporation of EU programming practices in domestic practices in the UK (and other member states).
Another specific EU effect is the increase of participants in local governance through the partnership principle – representatives of business, trade unions, non-governmental organisations and the voluntary and community sector. Marshall (2004: 14) notes that non-governmental actors account for approximately half of the membership of the Strathclyde European Partnership. While the partnership models within each city reflect specific local institutional characteristics, they display ‘a commitment to joint working, capacity-building and holistic thinking that is less evident in non-beneficiary cities across Britain’ (Marshall, 2004: 15).
Marshall’s finding that inter-agency working has had effects beyond EU programmes is confirmed by other research. Bachtler and Taylor (2003: 35) illustrate how some partnerships set up for structural funding have formally constituted themselves and taken on a wider role, citing examples in Scotland and Wales. A mid-term evaluation of the Objective 2 structural fund programmes in the UK found a diminishing effect of the structural funds on partnership working over time. However, this was because partnership working had become embedded in regeneration policy-making to such an extent that it was ‘now viewed as being part of the architecture’ (Fraser Associates 2003, cited in ECOTEC 2003: 45).
Partnership was not a new concept in the UK when the 1989 reform of the structural funds came into effect (Bache, 2001). However, it was a different beast in UK regeneration policies, used primarily by the Conservative government to undermine local government and increase the role of the private sector. A major contribution of the EU partnership requirement, which sought to empower local and regional authorities, was that over time it broke down barriers to inter-agency working for many in British local government, who came to see it more as an opportunity than a threat. This encouraged new ways of working and the development of new networking skills. In this sense the EU has promoted a more consensual and cross-sectoral approach to politics and policy-making in these areas than was generally the case in the adversarial circumstances of the 1980s. 

The Sub-local Level
Chapman (2004) highlights an ‘increasing emphasis’ on the role of the voluntary and community sectors (VCS) in structural fund decision-making. This role is promoted by the partnership principle and given particular encouragement by the Commission. At the sub-local level, the Commission’s community economic development (CED) approach to partnership has brought new actors into the policy process. The CED approach funds ‘capacity building’ measures to facilitate ‘bottom-up’ approaches to development in the most deprived communities, in which local residents are expected take a lead role.
In her study of the implementation of EU Objective 1 structural fund programme in the sub-region of South Yorkshire, Chapman portrays a complex multi-level network of relationships below the level of the region, developed to incorporate community actors in decision-making at various levels (see Diagram 1 below). The administration of the programme overall is overseen by the sub-regional programme monitoring committee, which is chaired by the Director of the Government Regional Office, and includes representation from public, private and voluntary sectors, including the Commission central government departments and local authorities. At the local/municipal level, are programme links to individual local authorities and colleges, local strategic partnerships and task groups established to assist community partnerships in the development of action plans. Below this are the community partnerships involving residents, which should lead decision-making at this level. 
Developing bottom-up approaches to economic and social regeneration is widely acknowledged to be a difficult task. In the South Yorkshire context, support for the VCS is provided by a sub-regional umbrella organisation established by the Objective 1 programme for that very purpose. Chapman (forthcoming) concludes that the overall effects of the structural funds on the VCS are mixed, although there is evidence of empowerment in some areas. At this level, very specific local factors are often crucial in determining the extent to which community partnerships lead the process of regeneration. 
CED is regularly seen as one of the innovative aspects of structural funding (Bachtler and Taylor 2003: vi) and has been influential over domestic policies for community-based regeneration, such as New Deal for Communities and the Single Regeneration Budget. Particularly influential was the ‘Pathways to Employment’ experiment within the Merseyside 1994-99 Objective 1 programme, which was identified by national government as a model of best practice and informed domestic programmes aimed at addressing social exclusion (ECOTEC, 2003: 19). At the neighbourhood  level, there is also evidence that lessons have been drawn from practices developed in EU programmes and incorporated into domestic practices (Catney, forthcoming).

Conclusion
This paper raised the question of the extent to which Europeanization has promoted multi-level governance in Britain. In terms of the definition of Europeanization set out, there has indeed been a ‘reorientation and reshaping of aspects of politics and governance in the domestic arena’ through EU cohesion policy. The empirical evidence suggests that there has been a distinct EU effect at the regional level and below. This has had both a territorial dimension in enhancing the English regional tier, and a governance dimension, through the effects of partnership programming at the regional and local/municipal levels, and through CED below the municipal level. In making these claims, there are three other observations to make: the first relates to multi-level governance, the second to Europeanization, and the third to the role and power of the state in this changing context.
First, that while there is a distinct EU contribution to multi-level governance, the overall effects on the British polity of this should not be overstated. The English regions have undoubtedly been strengthened in the past two decades and there is evidence that the structural funds have played a role. However, the English regions remain relatively weak within the UK’s constitutional arrangements: the main institutions at regional level remain Regional Development Agencies overseen by unelected Regional Assemblies. This weakness was confirmed by the decisive vote (4-1) against elected regional government in the North East region last November – the region most likely to vote ‘yes’. Other planned referendums in the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside have been postponed and the issue has fallen from the agenda. In terms of Type 1 multi-level governance, which relates to ‘general purpose’ jurisdictions therefore, the domestic devolution agenda has been far more significant (although the story may not yet be over​[4]​).
Beyond the regions, there is clear evidence that the EU has promoted Type II multi-level governance, leading to the proliferation of task-specific cross-sectoral bodies at regional, local and sub-local levels. This has intrinsic importance in signalling a shift in the nature of governance and a shifting style of politics towards consensualism. However, just as the English regional tier remains weak within the British system of governance, so does the role of localities and there is no suggestion that this situation has been significantly affected by the EU. Moreover, no significant political claims are made – at this stage at least – for the growing number of bottom-up programmes in Britain.
	A second observation is that the notion of ‘adaptational pressure’ emanating from EU requirements infers a degree of coercion that understates the importance of learning in the process of ‘Europeanization’, particularly in the later phase of the case considered here. It is clear that EU policies provided pressures (and incentives) for new structures and processes, but there is also plenty of evidence in the period up to the mid-1990s that most of those introduced were superficial, and that established practices and power relations survived the surface changes (Bache 2000a). If there was learning in this period, it was of the ‘single loop’ type – that is, a readjustment of actor strategies to allow them to achieve the same objectives in a new context. However, from around the mid-1990s – after several years of a relatively stable structural policy framework – there is greater evidence of ‘double-loop’ learning, in which key actors involved changed their goals and preferences​[5]​. This is evident in the transference of lessons drawn from EU policies into domestic policies (above).
	Finally, it is important to consider the role of the state in this changing context. In the first phase of the ‘new English regionalism’, central government sought to steer EU regional policy networks and acted as a financial gatekeeper over the domestic effects of the funds. The creation of GROs by the Conservative government was partly an attempt to steer the regional networks more effectively, which they proved capable of doing (Bache, 2000b). However, by the late GROs 1990s were often facilitating rather than steering networks, even where partnership relations had been most problematic. This change was partly through a process of learning induced by EU structural policy; through experience of partnership working GROs became more comfortable with the practice and less interventionist in detailed processes (Bache 2000a). If this process of change started in the regional civil service, it became more widespread with the election of a Labour government in 1997, less opposed in principle to regional policy, less hostile to the EU and enthusiastic about partnership.
	Yet while the Labour government has embraced many aspects of the EU’s regional policy, becoming a keen advocate of partnership and bottom-up approaches in particular, it has also outlined the boundaries of its support and the ongoing centrality of its role. First, by demonstrating that while it has sympathy for regional development and devolved institutions, this does not stretch to conceding control over the financial mechanisms through which EU structural funding is allocated in the UK: the Treasury remains the financial gatekeeper (Bache and Bristow, 2003). Second, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has called for a renationalization of EU regional policy to allow the wealthier member states to reclaim and spend their share of structural funding domestically (Treasury/DTI/ODPM, 2003) 
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^1	  The Europeanization of British Politics and Policy-Making was funded as a study group by the University Association of Contemporary European Studies and subsequently funded as a seminar series by the Economic and Social Research Council (see www.shef.ac.uk/ebpp). The findings are being collated in Bache, I. and Jordan, A. (eds.) (forthcoming), The Europeanization of British Politics?, Basingstoke: Palgrave. I am grateful to Adam Marshall, one of the contributors, for his comments on this paper.
^2	  This section draws on forthcoming work by Bache and George (forthcoming) and Bache and Jordan (forthcoming). I am grateful to Stephen George and Andrew Jordan for their permission to draw on this work here. 
^3	  A study of the Yorkshire and Humber (Bache 2000) illustrates the ongoing importance of sub-regional and metropolitan networks alongside the gradual emergence and identification of a regional elite up to and just after 1997.
^4	  It should be noted that there was a similar vote against devolution to Wales in 1979, only for a vote in favour less than two decades later.
^5	  For a discussion of ‘single loop’ and ‘double loop’ learning, see Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 12).
